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Abstract
Many popular applications use traces of user data to offer various services to their users. However,
even if user data is anonymized and obfuscated, a user’s privacy can be compromised through the use of
statistical matching techniques that match a user trace to prior user behavior. In this work, we derive the
theoretical bounds on the privacy of users in such a scenario. We build on our recent study in the area
of location privacy, in which we introduced formal notions of location privacy for anonymization-based
location privacy-protection mechanisms. Here we derive the fundamental limits of user privacy when
both anonymization and obfuscation-based protection mechanisms are applied to users’ time series of
data. We investigate the impact of such mechanisms on the trade-off between privacy protection and
user utility. We first study achievability results for the case where the time-series of users are governed
by an i.i.d. process. The converse results are proved both for the i.i.d. case as well as the more general
Markov chain model. We demonstrate that as the number of users in the network grows, the obfuscation-
anonymization plane can be divided into two regions: in the first region, all users have perfect privacy;
and, in the second region, no user has privacy.
Index Terms
Anonymization, Obfuscation, Information theoretic privacy, Privacy-Protection Mechanism (PPM),
User-Data Driven Services (UDD).
N. Takbiri is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, 01003
USA e-mail: (ntakbiri@umass.edu).
A. Houmansadr is with the College of Information and Computer Sciences, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, 01003
USA e-mail:(amir@cs.umass.edu)
H. Pishro-Nik and D. Goeckel are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, MA, 01003 USA e-mail:(pishro@engin.umass.edu)
This work was supported by National Science Foundation under grants CCF–0844725, CCF–1421957 and CNS1739462.
This work was presented in part in IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2017) [1].
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
00
19
7v
3 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
8 J
un
 20
18
2I. INTRODUCTION
A number of emerging systems and applications work by analyzing the data submitted by
their users in order to serve them; we call such systems User-Data Driven (UDD) services.
Examples of UDD services include smart cities, connected vehicles, smart homes, and connected
healthcare devices, which have the promise of greatly improving users’ lives. Unfortunately, the
sheer volume of user data collected by these systems can compromise users’ privacy [2]. Even
the use of standard Privacy-Protection Mechanisms (PPMs), specifically anonymization of user
identities and obfuscation of submitted data, does not guarantee users’ privacy, as adversaries
are able to use powerful statistical inference techniques to learn sensitive private information of
the users [3]–[7].
To illustrate the threat of privacy leakage, consider three popular UDD services: (1) Health
care: Wearable monitors that constantly track user health variables can be invaluable in assessing
individual health trends and responding to emergencies. However, such monitors produce long
time-series of user data uniquely matched to the health characteristics of each user; (2) Smart
homes: Emerging smart-home technologies such as fine-grained power measurement systems can
help users and utility providers to address one of the key challenges of the twenty-first century:
energy conservation. But the measurements of power by such devices can be mapped to users
and reveal their lifestyle habits; and, (3) Connected vehicles: The location data provided by
connected vehicles promises to greatly improve everyday life by reducing congestion and traffic
accidents. However, the matching of such location traces to prior behavior not only allows for
user tracking, but also reveals a user’s habits. In summary, despite their potential impact on
society and their emerging popularity, these UDD services have one thing in common: their
utility critically depends on their collection of user data, which puts users’ privacy at significant
risk.
There are two main approaches to augment privacy in UDD services: identity perturba-
tion (anonymization) [8]–[15], and data perturbation (obfuscation) [16]–[18]. In anonymization
techniques, privacy is obtained by concealing the mapping between users and data, and the
mapping is changed periodically to thwart statistical inference attacks that try to de-anonymize
the anonymized data traces by matching user data to known user profiles. Some approaches
employ k-anonymity to keep each user’s identity indistinguishable within a group of k − 1
other users [19]–[25]. Other approaches employ users’ pseudonyms within areas called mix-
3zones [26]–[28]. Obfuscation mechanisms aim at protecting privacy by perturbing user data, e.g.,
by adding noise to users’ samples of data. For instance, cloaking replaces each user’s sample of
data with a larger region [29]–[34], while an alternative approach is to use dummy data in the
set of possible data of the users [35]–[39]. In [40], a mechanism of obfuscation was introduced
where the answer was changed randomly with some small probability. Here we consider the
fundamental limits of a similar obfuscation technique for providing privacy in the long time
series of emerging applications.
The anonymization and obfuscation mechanisms improve user privacy at the cost of user utility.
The anonymization mechanism works by frequently changing the pseudonym mappings of users
to reduce the length of time series that can be exploited by statistical analysis. However, this
frequent change may also decrease the usability by concealing the temporal relation between
a user’s sample of data, which may be critical in the utility of some systems, e.g., a dining
recommendation system that makes suggestions based on the dining history of its users. On the
other hand, obfuscation mechanisms work by adding noise to users’ collected data, e.g., location
information. The added noise may degrade the utility of UDD applications. Thus, choosing the
right level of the privacy-protection mechanism is an important question, and understanding
what levels of anonymization and obfuscation can provide theoretical guarantees of privacy is
of interest.
In this paper, we will consider the ability of an adversary to perform statistical analyses on time
series and match the series to descriptions of user behavior. In related work, Unnikrishnan [7]
provides a comprehensive analysis of the asymptotic (in the length of the time series) optimal
matching of time series to source distributions. However, there are several key differences
between that analysis and the work here. First, Unnikrishnan [7] looks at the optimal matching
tests, but does not consider any privacy metrics as considered in this paper, and a significant
component of our study is demonstrating that mutual information converges to zero so that we
can conclude there is no privacy leakage (hence, “perfect privacy”). Second, the setting of [7]
is different, as it does not consider: (a) obfuscation, which is one of the two major protection
mechanisms; and (b) sources that are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Third,
the setting of Unnikrishnan [7] assumes a fixed distribution on sources (i.e., classical inference),
whereas we assume the existence of general (but possibly unknown) prior distributions for the
sources (i.e., a Bayesian setting). Finally, we study the fundamental limits in terms of both the
number of users and the number of observations, while Unnikrishnan [7] focuses on the case
4where the number of users is a fixed, finite value.
Numerous researchers have put forward ideas for quantifying privacy-protection. Shokri et
al. [12], [41] define the expected estimation error of the adversary as a metric to evaluate PPMs.
Ma et al. [11] use uncertainty about users’ information to quantify user privacy in vehicular
networks. To defeat localization attacks and achieve privacy at the same time, Shokri et al. [16]
proposed a method which finds optimal PPM for an LBS given service quality constraints.
In [42] and [43], privacy leakage of data sharing and interdependent privacy risks are quantified,
respectively. A similar idea is proposed in [44] where the quantification model is based on
the Bayes conditional risk. Previously, mutual information has been used as a privacy metric
in a number of settings, [45]–[53]. However, the framework and problem formulation for our
setting (Internet of Things (IoT) privacy) are quite different from those encountered in previous
works. More specifically, the IoT privacy problem we consider here is based on a large set of
time-series data that belongs to different users with different statistical patterns that has gone
through a privacy-preserving mechanism, and the adversary is aiming at de-anonymizing and
de-obfuscating the data.
The discussed studies demonstrate the growing importance of privacy. What is missing from
the current literature is a solid theoretical framework for privacy that is general enough to
encompass various privacy-preserving methods in the literature. Such a framework will allow
us to achieve provable privacy guarantees, obtain fundamental trade-offs between privacy and
performance, and provide analytical tools to optimally achieve provable privacy. We derive the
fundamental limits of user privacy in UDD services in the presence of both anonymization and
obfuscation protection mechanisms. We build on our previous works on formalizing privacy
in location-based services [54], [55], but we significantly expand those works here not just in
application area but also user models and settings. In particular, our previous works introduced
the notion of perfect privacy for location-based services, and we derived the rate at which an
anonymization mechanism should change the pseudonyms in order to achieve the defined perfect
privacy. In this work, we expand the notion of perfect privacy to UDD services in general and
derive the conditions for it to hold when both anonymization and obfuscation-based protection
mechanisms are employed.
In this paper, we consider two models for users’ data: i.i.d. and Markov chains. After introduc-
ing the general framework in Section II, we consider an i.i.d. model extensively in Section III and
the first half of Section IV. We obtain achievability and converse results for the i.i.d. model. The
5i.i.d. model would apply directly to data that is sampled at a low rate. In addition, understanding
the i.i.d. case can also be considered the first step toward understanding the more complicated
case where there is dependency, as was done for anonymization-only Location Privacy-Preserving
Mechanisms (LPPMs) in [54], and will be done in Section IV-C. In particular, in Section IV-C,
a general Markov chain model is used to model users’ data pattern to capture the dependency
of the user’ data pattern over time. There, we obtain converse results for privacy for this model.
In Section V, we provide some discussion about the achievability for the Markov chain case.
A. Summary of the Results
Given n, the total number of the users in a network, their degree of privacy depends on two
parameters: (1) The number of observations m = m(n) by the adversary per user for a fixed
anonymization mapping (i.e., the number of observations before the pseudonyms are changed);
and (2) the value of the noise added by the obfuscation technique (as defined in Section II, we
quantify the obfuscation noise with a parameter an, where larger an means a higher level of
obfuscation). Intuitively, smaller m(n) and larger an result in stronger privacy, at the expense of
lower utility for the users.
Our goal is to identify values of an and m(n) that satisfy perfect privacy in the asymptote of
a large number of users (n → ∞). When the users’ datasets are governed by an i.i.d. process,
we show that the m(n) − an plane can be divided into two areas. In the first area, all users have
perfect privacy (as defined in Section II), and, in the second area, users have no privacy. Figure 1
shows the limits of privacy in the entire m(n) − an plane. As the figure shows, in regions 1, 2,
and 3, users have perfect privacy, while in region 4 users have no privacy.
For the case where the users’ datasets are governed by irreducible and aperiodic Markov
chains with r states and |E | edges, we show that users will have no privacy if m = cn 2|E |−r +α
and an = c′n
−
(
1
|E |−r +β
)
, for any constants c > 0, c′ > 0, α > 0, and β > α4 . We also provide some
insights for the opposite direction (under which conditions users have perfect privacy) for the
case of Markov chains.
II. FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we adopt a similar framework to that employed in [54], [55]. The general set up
is provided here, and the refinement to the precise models for this paper will be presented in the
following sections. We assume a system with n users with Xu(k) denoting a sample of the data
6Fig. 1: Limits of privacy in the entire m(n) − an plane: in regions 1, 2, and 3, users have perfect
privacy, and in region 4 users have no privacy.
of user u at time k, which we would like to protect from an interested adversary A. We consider
a strong adversary A that has complete statistical knowledge of the users’ data patterns based
on the previous observations or other resources. In order to secure data privacy of users, both
obfuscation and anonymization techniques are used as shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2, Zu(k)
shows the (reported) sample of the data of user u at time k after applying obfuscation, and Yu(k)
shows the (reported) sample of the data of user u at time k after applying anonymization. The
adversary observes only Yu(k), k = 1, 2, · · · ,m(n), where m(n) is the number of observations of
each user before the identities are permuted. The adversary then tries to estimate Xu(k) by using
those observations.
Fig. 2: Applying obfuscation and anonymization techniques to users’ data samples.
7Let Xu be the m(n) × 1 vector containing the sample of the data of user u, and X be the
m(n) × n matrix with uth column equal to Xu;
Xu =

Xu(1)
Xu(2)
...
Xu(m)

, X = [X1,X2, · · · ,Xn] .
Data Samples Model: We assume there are r ≥ 2 possible values (0, 1, · · · , r − 1) for each
sample of the users’ data. In the first part of the paper (perfect privacy analysis), we assume
an i.i.d. model as motivated in Section I. In the second part of the paper (converse results: no
privacy region), the users’ datasets are governed by irreducible and aperiodic Markov chains. At
any time, Xu(k) is equal to a value in {0, 1, · · · , r − 1} according to a user-specific probability
distribution. The collection of user distributions, which satisfy some mild regularity conditions
discussed below, is known to the adversary A, and he/she employs such to distinguish different
users based on statistical matching of those user distributions to traces of user activity of length
m(n).
Obfuscation Model: The first step in obtaining privacy is to apply the obfuscation operation
in order to perturb the users’ data samples. In this paper, we assume that each user has only
limited knowledge of the characteristics of the overall population and thus we employ a simple
distributed method in which the samples of the data of each user are reported with error with
a certain probability, where that probability itself is generated randomly for each user. In other
words, the obfuscated data is obtained by passing the users’ data through an r-ary symmetric
channel with a random error probability. More precisely, let Zu be the vector which contains the
obfuscated versions of user u’s data samples, and Z is the collection of Zu for all users,
Zu =

Zu(1)
Zu(2)
...
Zu(m)

, Z = [Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn] .
To create a noisy version of data samples, for each user u, we independently generate a random
variable Ru that is uniformly distributed between 0 and an, where an ∈ (0, 1]. The value of
Ru gives the probability that a user’s data sample is changed to a different data sample by
obfuscation, and an is termed the “noise level” of the system. For the case of r = 2 where there
8are two states for users’ data (state 0 and state 1), the obfuscated data is obtained by passing
users’ data through a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with a small error probability [40].
Thus, we can write
Zu(k) =

Xu(k), with probability 1 − Ru.
1 − Xu(k), with probability Ru.
When r > 2, for l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}:
P(Zu(k) = l |Xu(k) = i) =

1 − Ru, for l = i.
Ru
r−1, for l , i.
Note that the effect of the obfuscation is to alter the probability distribution function of each
user across the r possibilities in a way that is unknown to the adversary, since it is independent
of all past activity of the user, and hence the obfuscation inhibits user identification. For each
user, Ru is generated once and is kept constant for the collection of samples of length m(n),
thus, providing a very low-weight obfuscation algorithm. We will discuss the extension to the
case where Ru is regenerated independently over time in Section V. There, we will also provide
a discussion about obfuscation using continuous noise distributions (e.g., Gaussian noise).
Anonymization Model: Anonymization is modeled by a random permutation Π on the set of
n users. The user u is assigned the pseudonym Π(u). Y is the anonymized version of Z; thus,
Y = Perm (Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn;Π)
=
[
ZΠ−1(1),ZΠ−1(2), · · · ,ZΠ−1(n)
]
= [Y1,Y2, · · · ,Yn] ,
where Perm( . ,Π) is permutation operation with permutation function Π. As a result, Yu =
ZΠ−1(u) and YΠ(u) = Zu.
Adversary Model: We protect against the strongest reasonable adversary. Through past obser-
vations or some other sources, the adversary is assumed to have complete statistical knowledge
of the users’ patterns; in other words, he/she knows the probability distribution for each user
on the set of data samples {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}. As discussed in the model for the data samples,
the parameters pu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n are drawn independently from a continuous density function,
fP(pu), which has support on a subset of a defined hypercube. The density fP(pu) might be
unknown to the adversary, as all that is assumed here is that such a density exists, and it will
be evident from our results that knowing or not knowing fP(pu) does not change the results
9asymptotically. Specifically, from the results of Section III, we conclude that user u has perfect
privacy even if the adversary knows fP(pu). In addition, in Section IV, it is shown that the
adversary can recover the true data of user u at time k without using the specific density function
of fP(pu), and as result, users have no privacy even if the adversary does not know fP(pu).
The adversary also knows the value of an as it is a design parameter. However, the adversary
does not know the realization of the random permutation Π or the realizations of the random
variables Ru, as these are independent of the past behavior of the users. It is critical to note
that we assume the adversary does not have any auxiliary information or side information about
users’ data.
In [54], perfect privacy is defined as follows:
Definition 1. User u has perfect privacy at time k, if and only if
∀k ∈ N, lim
n→∞ I (Xu(k);Y) = 0,
where I(X;Y ) denotes the mutual information between random variables (vectors) X and Y .
In this paper, we also consider the situation in which there is no privacy.
Definition 2. For an algorithm for the adversary that tries to estimate the actual sample of data
of user u at time k, define
Pe(u, k) , P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) ,
where Xu(k) is the actual sample of the data of user u at time k, Xu(k) is the adversary’s estimated
sample of the data of user u at time k, and Pe(u, k) is the error probability. Now, define E as
the set of all possible adversary’s estimators; then, user u has no privacy at time k, if and only
if for large enough n,
∀k ∈ N, P∗e (u, k) , infE P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) → 0.
Hence, a user has no privacy if there exists an algorithm for the adversary to estimate Xu(k)
with diminishing error probability as n goes to infinity.
Discussion: Both of the privacy definitions given above (perfect privacy and no privacy) are
asymptotic in the number of users (n → ∞), which allows us to find clean analytical results
for the fundamental limits. Moreover, in many IoT applications, such as ride sharing and dining
recommendation applications, the number of users is large.
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Notation: Note that the sample of data of user u at time k after applying obfuscation (Zu(k))
and the sample of data of user u at time k after applying anonymization (Yu(k)) depend on
the number of users in the network (n), while the actual sample of data of user u at time k is
independent of the number of users (n). Despite the dependency in the former cases, we omit
this subscript (n) on
(
Z (n)u (k),Y (n)u (k)
)
to avoid confusion and make the notation consistent.
Notation: Throughout the paper, Xn
d−→ X denotes convergence in distribution. Also, We
use P
(
X = x
Y = y) for the conditional probability of X = x given Y = y. When we write
P
(
X = x
Y ) , we are referring to a random variable that is defined as a function of Y .
III. PERFECT PRIVACY ANALYSIS: I.I.D. CASE
A. Two-States Model
We first consider the two-states case (r = 2) which captures the salient aspects of the problem.
For the two-states case, the sample of the data of user u at any time is a Bernoulli random variable
with parameter pu, which is the probability of user u having data sample 1. Thus,
Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli (pu) .
Per Section II, the parameters pu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n are drawn independently from a continuous
density function, fP(pu), on the (0, 1) interval. We assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:1
δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ (0, 1).
fP(pu) = 0, pu < (0, 1).
The adversary knows the values of pu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n and uses this knowledge to identify
users. We will use capital letters (i.e., Pu) when we are referring to the random variable, and
use lower case (i.e., pu) to refer to the realization of Pu.
In addition, since the user data (Xu(k)) are i.i.d. and have a Bernoulli distribution, the obfus-
cated data (Zu(k)) are also i.i.d. with a Bernoulli distribution. Specifically,
Zu(k) ∼ Bernoulli (Qu) ,
1The condition δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2 is not actually necessary for the results and can be relaxed; however, we keep it here to
avoid unnecessary technicalities.
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where
Qu = Pu(1 − Ru) + (1 − Pu)Ru
= Pu + (1 − 2Pu) Ru,
and recall that Ru is the probability that user u’s data sample is altered at any time. For
convenience, define a vector where element Qu is the probability that an obfuscated data sample
of user u is equal to one, and
Q = [Q1,Q2, · · · ,Qn] .
Thus, a vector containing the permutation of those probabilities after anonymization is given by:
V = Perm (Q1,Q2, · · · ,Qn;Π)
=
[
QΠ−1(1),QΠ−1(2), · · · ,QΠ−1(n)
]
= [V1,V2, · · · ,Vn] ,
where Vu = QΠ−1(u) and VΠ(u) = Qu. As a result, for u = 1, 2, ..., n, the distribution of the data
symbols for the user with pseudonym u is given by:
Yu(k) ∼ Bernoulli (Vu) ∼ Bernoulli
(
QΠ−1(u)
)
.
The following theorem states that if an is significantly larger than 1n in this two-states model,
then all users have perfect privacy independent of the value of m(n).
Theorem 1. For the above two-states model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the
anonymized version of Z as defined above, and
• m = m(n) is arbitrary;
• Ru ∼ Uni f orm[0, an], where an , c′n−(1−β) for any c′ > 0 and 0 < β < 1;
then, user 1 has perfect privacy. That is,
∀k ∈ N, lim
n→∞ I (X1(k);Y) = 0.
The proof of Theorem 1 will be provided for the case 0 ≤ p1 < 12 , as the proof for the case
1
2 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 is analogous and is thus omitted.
Intuition behind the Proof of Theorem 1:
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Since m(n) is arbitrary, the adversary is able to estimate very accurately (in the limit, perfectly)
the distribution from which each data sequence Yu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n is drawn; that is, the adversary
is able to accurately estimate the probability Vu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n. Clearly, if there were no
obfuscation for each user u, the adversary would then simply look for the j such that p j is
very close to Vu and set X j(k) = Yu(k), resulting in no privacy for any user.
We want to make certain that the adversary obtains no information about X1(k), the sample
of data of user 1 at time k. To do such, we will establish that there are a large number of
users whom have a probability pu that when obfuscated could have resulted in a probability
consistent with p1. Consider asking whether another probability p2 is sufficiently close enough
to be confused with p1 after obfuscation; in particular, we will look for p2 such that, even if
the adversary is given the obfuscated probabilities VΠ(1) and VΠ(2), he/she cannot associate these
probabilities with p1 and p2. This requires that the distributions Q1 and Q2 of the obfuscated
data of user 1 and user 2 have significant overlap; we explore this next.
Recall that Qu = Pu + (1− 2Pu)Ru, and Ru ∼ Uni f orm[0, an]. Thus, we know Qu |Pu = pu has
a uniform distribution with length (1 − 2pu)an. Specifically,
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uni f orm [pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an] .
Figure 3 shows the distribution of Qu given Pu = pu.
Fig. 3: Distribution of Qu given Pu = pu.
Consider two cases: In the first case, the support of the distributions Q1
P1 = p1 and Q2P2 =
p2 are small relative to the difference between p1 and p2 (Figure 4); in this case, given the
probabilities VΠ(1) and VΠ(2) of the anonymized data sequences, the adversary can associate those
with p1 and p2 without error. In the second case, the support of the distributions Q1
P1 = p1
and Q2
P2 = p2 is large relative to the difference between p1 and p2 (Figure 5), so it is difficult
for the adversary to associate the probabilities VΠ(1) and VΠ(2) of the anonymized data sequences
with p1 and p2. In particular, if VΠ(1) and VΠ(2) fall into the overlap of the support of Q1 and Q2,
we will show the adversary can only guess randomly how to de-anonymize the data. Thus, if
13
the ratio of the support of the distributions to
p1 − p2 goes to infinity, the adversary’s posterior
probability for each user converges to 12 , thus, implying no information leakage on the user
identities. More generally, if we can guarantee that there will be a large set of users with pu’s
very close to p1 compared to the support of Q1
P1 = p1, we will be able to obtain perfect privacy
as demonstrated rigorously below.
Fig. 4: Case 1: The support of the distributions is small relative to the difference between p1
and p2.
Fig. 5: Case 2: The support of the distributions is large relative to the difference between p1
and p2.
Given this intuition, the formal proof proceeds as follows. Given p1, we define a set J(n) of
users whose parameter pu of their data distributions is sufficiently close to p1 (Figure 5; case
2), so that it is likely that Q1 and Qu cannot be readily associated with p1 and pu.
The purpose of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 is to show that, from the adversary’s perspective, the
users in set J(n) are indistinguishable. More specifically, the goal is to show that the obfuscated
data corresponding to each of these users could have been generated by any other users in J(n)
in an equally likely manner. To show this, Lemma 1 employs the fact that, if the observed values
of N uniformly distributed random variables (N is size of set J(n)) are within the intersection of
their ranges, it is impossible to infer any information about the matching between the observed
values and the distributions. That is, all possible N! matchings are equally likely. Lemmas 2 and
3 leverage Lemma 1 to show that even if the adversary is given a set that includes all of the
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pseudonyms of the users in set J(n) (i.e., Π(J(n)) ∆= {Π−1(u) ∈ J(n)}) he/she still will not be able
to infer any information about the matching of each specific user in set J(n) and his pseudonym.
Then Lemma 5 uses the above fact to show that the mutual information between the data set of
user 1 at time k and the observed data sets of the adversary converges to zero for large enough
n.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. Note, per Lemma 6 of Appendix A, it is sufficient to establish the results on a sequence
of sets with high probability. That is, we can condition on high-probability events.
Now, define the critical set J(n) with size N (n) =
J(n) for 0 ≤ p1 < 12 as follows:
J(n) = {u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : p1 ≤ Pu ≤ p1 + n; p1 + n ≤ Qu ≤ p1 + (1 − 2p1)an} ,
where n , 1
n1−
β
2
, an = c′n−(1−β) ,and β is defined in the statement of Theorem 1.
Note for large enough n, if 0 ≤ p1 < 12 , we have 0 ≤ pu < 12 . As a result,
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uni f orm (pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an) .
We can prove that with high probability, 1 ∈ J(n) for large enough n, as follows. First, Note that
Q1
P1 = p1 ∼ Uni f orm (p1, p1 + (1 − 2p1)an) .
Now, according to Figure 7,
P
(
1 ∈ J(n)
)
= 1 − n(1 − 2p1) an
= 1 − 1
(1 − 2p1) c′n β2
,
thus, for any c′ > 0 and large enough n,
P
(
1 ∈ J(n)
)
→ 1.
Now in the second step, we define the probability W (n)j for any j ∈ Π(J(n)) = {Π(u) : u ∈ J(n)}
as
W (n)j = P
(
Π(1) = j
V,Π(J(n))) .
W (n)j is the conditional probability that Π(1) = j after perfectly observing the values of the
permuted version of obfuscated probabilities (V) and set including all of the pseudonyms of the
15
Fig. 6: Range of Pu and Qu for elements of set J(n) and probability density function of Qu
Pu = pu.
Fig. 7: Range of Pu and Qu for elements of set J(n) and probability density function of Q1
P1 = p1.
users in set J(n)
(
Π(J(n))
)
. Since V and Π(J(n)) are random, W (n)j is a random variable. However,
we will prove shortly that in fact W (n)j =
1
N (n) , for all j ∈ Π(J(n)).
Note: Since we are looking from the adversary’s point of view, the assumption is that all
the values of Pu, u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} are known, so all of the probabilities are conditioned on the
values of P1 = p1, P2 = p2, · · · , Pn = pn. Thus, to be accurate, we should write
W (n)j = P
(
Π(1) = j
V,Π(J(n)), P1, P2, · · · , Pn) .
Nevertheless, for simplicity of notation, we often omit the conditioning on P1, P2, · · · , Pn.
First, we need a lemma from elementary probability.
Lemma 1. Let N be a positive integer, and let a1, a2, · · · , aN and b1, b2, · · · , bN be real numbers
such that au ≤ bu for all u. Assume that X1, X2, · · · , XN are independent random variables such
that
Xu ∼ Uni f orm[au, bu].
Let also γ1, γ2, · · · , γN be distinct real numbers such that
γ j ∈
N⋂
u=1
[au, bu] for all j ∈ {1, 2, .., N}.
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Suppose that we know the event E has occurred, meaning that the observed values of Xu’s are
equal to the set of γ j’s (but with unknown ordering), i.e.,
E ≡ {X1, X2, · · · , XN } = {γ1, γ2, · · · , γN },
then
P
(
X1 = γ j |E
)
=
1
N
.
Proof. Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix B. 
Using the above lemma, we can state our desired result for W (n)j .
Lemma 2. For all j ∈ Π(J(n)), W (n)j = 1N (n) .
Proof. We argue that the setting of this lemma is essentially equivalent to the assumptions in
Lemma 1. First, remember that
W (n)j = P
(
Π(1) = j
V,Π(J(n))) .
Note that Qu = Pu + (1 − 2Pu)Ru, and since Ru is uniformly distributed, Qu conditioned on
Pu is also uniformly distributed in the appropriate intervals. Moreover, since Vu = QΠ−1(u), we
conclude Vu is also uniformly distributed. So, looking at the definition of W
(n)
j , we can say the
following: given the values of the uniformly distributed random variables Qu, we would like to
know which one of the values in V is the actual value of Q1 = VΠ(1), i.e., is Π(1) = j? This is
equivalent to the setting of Lemma 1 as described further below.
Note that since 1 ∈ J(n), Π(1) ∈ Π(J(n)). Therefore, when searching for the value of Π(1), it
is sufficient to look inside set Π(J(n)). Therefore, instead of looking among all the values of Vj ,
it is sufficient to look at Vj for j ∈ Π(J(n)). Let’s show these values by VΠ = {v1, v2, · · · , vN (n)},
so,
W (n)j = P
(
Π(1) = j
VΠ,Π(J(n))) .
Thus, we have the following scenario: Qu, u ∈ J(n) are independent random variables, and
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uni f orm[pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an].
Also, v1, v2, · · · , vN (n) are the observed values of Qu with unknown ordering (unknown mapping
Π). We also know from the definition of set J(n) that
Pu ≤ p1 + n ≤ Qu,
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Qu ≤ p1(1 − 2an) + an ≤ Pu(1 − 2an) + an,
so, we can conclude
v j ∈
N (n)⋂
u=1
[pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an] for all j ∈ {1, 2, .., N (n)}.
We know the event E has occurred, meaning that the observed values of Qu’s are equal to set
of v j’s (but with unknown ordering), i.e.,
E ≡ {Qu, u ∈ J(n)} = {v1, v2, · · · , vN (n)}.
Then, according to Lemma 1,
P
(
Q1 = v j |E, P1, P2, · · · , Pn
)
=
1
N (n)
.
Note that there is a subtle difference between this lemma and Lemma 1. Here N (n) is a random
variable while N is a fixed number in Lemma 1. Nevertheless, since the assertion holds for every
fixed N , it also holds for the case where N is a random variable. Now, note that
P
(
Q1 = v j |E, P1, P2, · · · , Pn
)
= P
(
Π(1) = j
E, P1, P2, · · · , Pn)
= P
(
Π(1) = j
VΠ,Π(J(n)), P1, P2, · · · , Pn)
= W (n)j .
Thus, we can conclude
W (n)j =
1
N (n)
.

In the third step, we define W˜ (n)j for any j ∈ Π(J(n)) as
W˜ (n)j = P
(
Π(1) = j
Y,Π(J(n))) .
W˜ (n)j is the conditional probability that Π(1) = j after observing the values of the anonymized
version of the obfuscated samples of the users’ data (Y) and the aggregate set including all the
pseudonyms of the users in set J(n) (i.e., Π(J(n)) ∆= {Π−1( j) ∈ J(n)}). Since Y and Π(J(n)) are
random, W˜ (n)j is a random variable. Now, in the following lemma, we will prove W˜
(n)
j =
1
N (n) ,
for all j ∈ Π(J(n)) by using Lemma 3.
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Note in the following lemma, we want to show that even if the adversary is given a set
including all of the pseudonyms of the users in set J(n), he/she cannot match each specific user
in set J(n) and his pseudonym.
Lemma 3. For all j ∈ Π(J(n)), W˜ (n)j = 1N (n) .
Proof. First, note that
W˜ (n)j =
∑
for all v
P
(
Π(1) = j
Y,Π (J(n)) ,V = v) P (V = vY,Π (J(n))) .
Also, we note that given V, Π(J(n)), and Y are independent. Intuitively, this is because when
observing Y, any information regarding Π(J(n)) is leaked through estimating V. This can be
rigorously proved similar to the proof of Lemma 1 in [54]. We can state this fact as
P
(
Yu(k)
 Vu = vu,Π(J(n))) = P (Yu(k)  Vu = vu) = vu.
The right and left hand side are given by Bernoulli(vu) distributions.
As a result,
W˜ (n)j =
∑
for all v
P
(
Π(1) = j
Π(J(n)),V = v) P (V = vY,Π (J(n))) .
Note W (n)j = P
(
Π(1) = j
Π(J(n)),V) , so
W˜ (n)j =
∑
for all v
W (n)j P
(
V = v
Y,Π (J(n)))
=
1
N (n)
∑
for all v
P
(
V = v
Y,Π (J(n)))
=
1
N (n)
.

To show that no information is leaked, we need to show that the size of set J(n) goes to
infinity. This is established in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. If N (n) , |J(n) |, then N (n) → ∞ with high probability as n→ ∞. More specifically,
there exists λ > 0 such that
P
(
N (n) >
λ
2
n
β
2
)
→ 1.
Proof. Lemma 4 is proved in Appendix C. 
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In the final step, we define Ŵ (n)j for any j ∈ Π(J(n)) as
Ŵ (n)j = P
(
X1(k) = 1
Y,Π(J(n))) .
Ŵ (n)j is the conditional probability that X1(k) = 1 after observing the values of the anonymized
version of the obfuscated samples of the users’ data (Y) and the aggregate set including all of the
pseudonyms of the users in set J(n) (Π(J(n))). Ŵ (n)j is a random variable because Y and Π(J(n))
are random. Now, in the following lemma, we will prove Ŵ (n)j converges in distribution to p1.
Note that this is the probability from the adversary’s point of view. That is, given that the
adversary has observed Y as well as the extra information Π(J(n)), what can he/she infer about
X1(k)?
Lemma 5. For all j ∈ Π(J(n)), Ŵ (n)j
d−→ p1.
Proof. We know
Ŵ (n)j =
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = j,Y,Π(J(n))) P (Π(1) = jY,Π(J(n))) ,
and according to the definition W˜ (n)j = P
(
Π(1) = j
Y,Π(J(n))) , we have
Ŵ (n)j =
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = j,Y,Π(J(n))) W˜ (n)j
=
1
N (n)
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = j,Y,Π(J(n))) .
We now claim that
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = j,Y,Π(J(n))) = p1 + o(1).
The reasoning goes as follows. Given Π(1) = j and knowing Y, we know that
YΠ(1)(k) = Z1(k) =

X1(k), with probability 1 − R1.
1 − X1(k), with probability R1.
Thus, given Yj(k) = 1, Bayes’ rule yields:
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = j,Y,Π(J(n))) = (1 − R1) P(X1(k) = 1)P(YΠ(1)(k) = 1)
= (1 − R1) p1p1(1 − R1) + (1 − p1)R1
= 1 − o(1),
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and similarly, given Yj(k) = 0,
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = j,Y,Π(J(n))) = R1 P(X1(k) = 1)P(YΠ(1)(k) = 0)
= R1
p1
p1(1 − R1) + (1 − p1)R1
= o(1).
Note that by the independence assumption, the above probabilities do not depend on the other
values of Yu(k) (as we are conditioning on Π(1) = j ). Thus, we can write
Ŵ (n)j =
1
N (n)
∑
j∈Π(J(n))
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = j,Y,Π(J(n)))
=
1
N (n)
∑
j∈Π(J(n)),Yj (k)=1
(1 − o(1)) + 1
N (n)
∑
j∈Π(J(n)),Yj (k)=0
o(1).
First, note that since
{ j ∈ Π(J(n)),Yj(k) = 0} ≤ N (n), the second term above converges to zero,
thus,
Ŵ (n)j →
{ j ∈ Π(J(n)),YΠ(1)(k) = 1}
N (n)
.
Since for all j ∈ Π(J(n)), Yj(k) ∼ Bernoulli (p1 + o(1)), by a simple application of Chebyshev’s
inequality, we can conclude Ŵ (n)j → p1. Appendix D provides the detail. 
As a result,
X1(k)|Y,Π(J(n)) → Bernoulli(p1),
thus,
H
(
X1(k)
Y,Π(J(n))) → H (X1(k)) .
Since conditioning reduces entropy,
H
(
X1(k)
Y,Π(J(n))) ≤ H (X1(k)Y) ,
and as a result,
lim
n→∞H (X1(k)) − H
(
X1(k)
Y) ≤ 0,
and
lim
n→∞ I (X1(k);Y) ≤ 0.
By knowing that I (X1(k);Y) cannot take any negative value, we can conclude that
I (X1(k);Y) → 0.

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B. Extension to r-States
Now, assume users’ data samples can have r possibilities (0, 1, · · · , r − 1), and pu(i) shows
the probability of user u having data sample i. We define the vector pu and the matrix p as
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, p = [p1, p2, · · · , pn] .
We assume pu(i)’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function, fP(pu),
which has support on a subset of the (0, 1)r−1 hypercube (Note that the pu(i)’s sum to one, so
one of them can be considered as the dependent value and the dimension is r − 1). In particular,
define the range of the distribution as
Rp = {(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ (0, 1)r−1 : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xr−1 < 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1}.
Figure 8 shows the range Rp for the case where r = 3.
Fig. 8: Rp for case r = 3.
Then, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:
δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ Rp.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < Rp.
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The obfuscation is similar to the two-states case. Specifically, for l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r −1}, we can
write
P(Zu(k) = l |Xu(k) = i) =

1 − Ru, for l = i.
Ru
r−1, for l , i.
Theorem 2. For the above r-states model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the
anonymized version of Z as defined previously, and
• m = m(n) is arbitrary;
• Ru ∼ Uni f orm[0, an], where an , c′n−( 1r−1−β) for any c′ > 0 and 0 < β < 1r−1 ;
then, user 1 has perfect privacy. That is,
∀k ∈ N, lim
n→∞ I (X1(k);Y) = 0.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The major difference is that
instead of the random variables Pu,Qu,Vu, we need to consider the random vectors Pu,Qu,Vu.
Similarly, for user u, we define the vector Qu as
Qu =

Qu(1)
Qu(2)
...
Qu(r − 1)

.
In the r-states case,
Qu(i) = Pu(i)
(
1 − Ru(i)
)
+
(
1 − Pu(i)
)
Ru
r − 1
= Pu +
(
1 − rPu
)
Ru
r − 1 .
We also need to define the critical set J(n). First, for i = 0, 1, · · · , r −1, define set J(n)i as follows.
If 0 ≤ p1(i) < 1r , then,
J(n)i ={
u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : p1(i) ≤ Pu(i) ≤ p1(i) + n; p1(i) + n ≤ Qu(i) ≤ p1(i) + (1 − rp1(i)) anr − 1
}
,
where n , 1
n
1
r−1−
β
2
, an = c′n−( 1r−1−β), and β is defined in the statement of Theorem 2.
We then define the critical set J(n) as:
J(n) =
r−1⋂
l=0
J(n)i .
We can then repeat the same arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 to complete the proof.
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IV. CONVERSE RESULTS: NO PRIVACY REGION
In this section, we prove that if the number of observations by the adversary is larger than
its critical value and the noise level is less than its critical value, then the adversary can find an
algorithm to successfully estimate users’ data samples with arbitrarily small error probability.
Combined with the results of the previous section, this implies that asymptotically (as n →
∞), privacy can be achieved if and only if at least one of the two techniques (obfuscation or
anonymization) are used above their thresholds. This statement needs a clarification as follows:
Looking at the results of [54], we notice that anonymization alone can provide perfect privacy
if m(n) is below its threshold. On the other hand, the threshold for obfuscation requires some
anonymization: In particular, the identities of the users must be permuted once to prevent the
adversary from readily identifying the users.
A. Two-States Model
Again, we start with the i.i.d. two-states model. The data sample of user u at any time is a
Bernoulli random variable with parameter pu.
As before, we assume that pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density
function, fP(pu), on the (0, 1) interval. Specifically, there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:
δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ (0, 1).
fP(pu) = 0, pu < (0, 1).
Theorem 3. For the above two-states mode, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the
anonymized version of Z as defined, and
• m = cn2+α for any c > 0 and α > 0;
• Ru ∼ Uni f orm[0, an], where an , c′n−(1+β) for any c′ > 0 and β > α4 ;
then, user 1 has no privacy as n goes to infinity.
Since this is a converse result, we give an explicit detector at the adversary and show that it
can be used by the adversary to recover the true data of user 1.
Proof. The adversary first inverts the anonymization mapping Π to obtain Z1(k), and then
estimates the value of X1(k) from that. To invert the anonymization, the adversary calculates the
empirical probability that each string is in state 1 and then assigns the string with the empirical
probability closest to p1 to user 1.
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Fig. 9: p1, sets B(n) and C(n) for case r = 2.
Formally, for u = 1, 2, · · · , n, the adversary computes Yu, the empirical probability of user u
being in state 1, as follows:
Yu =
Yu(1) + Yu(2) + · · · + Yu(m)
m
,
thus,
YΠ(u) =
Zu(1) + Zu(2) + · · · + Zu(m)
m
.
As shown in Figure 9, define
B(n) , {x ∈ (0, 1); p1 − ∆n ≤ x ≤ p1 + ∆n} ,
where ∆n = 1
n1+
α
4
and α is defined in the statement of Theorem 3. We claim that for m = cn2+α,
an = c′n−(1+β), and large enough n,
1) P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
→ 1.
2) P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
))
→ 0.
As a result, the adversary can identify Π(1) by examining Yu’s and assigning the one in B(n)
to user 1. Note that YΠ(u) ∈ B(n) is a set (event) in the underlying probability space and can be
written as
{
ω ∈ Ω : YΠ(u)(ω) ∈ B(n)
}
.
First, we show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
→ 1.
We can write
P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
= P
©­­­«
m∑
k=1
Z1(k)
m
∈ B(n)
ª®®®¬
= P
©­­­«p1 − ∆n ≤
m∑
k=1
Z1(k)
m
≤ p1 + ∆n
ª®®®¬
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= P
(
mp1 − m∆n − mQ1 ≤
m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1 ≤ mp1 + m∆n − mQ1
)
.
Note that for any u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, we have
|pu −Qu | = |1 − 2pu |Ru
≤ Ru ≤ an,
so, we can conclude
P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
= P
(
mp1 − m∆n − mQ1 ≤
m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1 ≤ mp1 + m∆n − mQ1
)
≥ P
(
−m∆n + man ≤
m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1 ≤ −man + m∆n
)
= P
( m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1
 ≤ m(∆n − an)
)
.
Since an → 0, for p1 ∈ (0, 1) and large enough n, we can say p1 + an < 2p1. From Chernoff
bound, for any c, c′, α > 0 and β > α4 ,
P
( m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1
 ≤ m(∆n − an)
)
≥ 1 − 2e−
m(∆n−an)2
3Q1
≥ 1 − 2e−
1
3(p1+an) cn
2+α
(
1
n
1+α4
− c′
n1+β
)2
≥ 1 − 2e− c
′′
6p1
n
α
2 → 1.
As a result, as n becomes large,
P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
→ 1.
Now, we need to show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
))
→ 0.
First, we define
C(n) = {x ∈ (0, 1); p1 − 2∆n ≤ x ≤ p1 + 2∆n} ,
and claim as n goes to infinity,
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
Pu ∈ C(n)
))
→ 0.
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Note
4∆nδ1 < P
(
Pu ∈ C(n)
)
< 4∆nδ2,
and according to the union bound, for large enough n,
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
Pu ∈ C(n)
))
≤
n∑
u=2
P
(
Pu ∈ C(n)
)
≤ 4n∆nδ2
= 4n
1
n1+
α
4
δ2
= 4n−
α
4 δ2 → 0.
As a result, we can conclude that all pu’s are outside of C(n) for u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n} with high
probability.
Now, we claim that given all pu’s are outside of C(n), P
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
)
is small. Remember
that for any u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, we have
|pu −Qu | ≤ an.
Now, noting the definitions of sets B(n) and C(n), we can write for u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n},
P
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
)
≤ P
(YΠ(u) −Qu ≥ (∆n − an))
= P
( m∑
k=1
Zu(k) − mQu
 > m(∆n − an)
)
.
According to the Chernoff bound, for any c, c′, α > 0 and β > α4 ,
P
( m∑
k=1
Zu(k) − mQu
 > m(∆n − an)
)
≤ 2e−
m(∆n−an)2
3Q1
≤ 2e−
1
3(p1+an) cn
2+α
(
1
n
1+α4
− c′
n1+β
)2
≤ 2e− c
′′
6p1
n
α
2
.
Now, by using a union bound, we have
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
))
≤
n∑
u=2
P
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
)
≤ n
(
2e−
c′′
6p1
n
α
2
)
,
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and thus, as n goes to infinity,
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
))
→ 0.
So, the adversary can successfully recover Z1(k). Since Z1(k) = X1(k) with probability 1−R1 =
1−o(1), the adversary can recover X1(k) with vanishing error probability for large enough n. 
B. Extension to r-States
Now, assume users’ data samples can have r possibilities (0, 1, · · · , r − 1), and pu(i) shows
the probability of user u having data sample i. We define the vector pu and the matrix p as
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, p = [p1, p2, · · · , pn] .
We also assume pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function, fP(pu),
which has support on a subset of the (0, 1)r−1 hypercube. In particular, define the range of
distribution as
Rp =
{(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ (0, 1)r−1 : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xr−1 < 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1} .
Then, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:
δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ Rp.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < Rp.
Theorem 4. For the above r-states mode, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the
anonymized version of Z as defined, and
• m = cn
2
r−1+α for any c > 0 and 0 < α < 1;
• Ru ∼ Uni f orm[0, an], where an , c′n−( 1r−1+β) for any c′ > 0 and β > α4 ;
then, user 1 has no privacy as n goes to infinity.
The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to the proof of Theorem 3, so we just provide the general
idea. We similarly define the empirical probability that the user with pseudonym u has data
sample i
(
Yu(i)
)
as follows:
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Fig. 10: p1, sets B′(n) and C′(n) in Rp for case r = 3.
Yu(i) = |{k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} : Yu(k) = i}|m ,
thus,
YΠ(u)(i) = |{k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} : Yu(k) = i}|m .
The difference is that now for each u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, Yu is a vector of size r − 1. In other
words,
Yu =

Yu(1)
Yu(2)
...
Yu(r − 1)

.
Define sets B′(n) and C′(n) as
B′(n) ,
{(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ Rp : p1(i) − ∆′n ≤ xi ≤ p1(i) + ∆′n, i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1} ,
C′(n) ,
{(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ Rp : p1(i) − 2∆′n ≤ xi ≤ p1(i) + 2∆′n, i = 1, 2, · · · , r − 1} ,
where ∆′n = 1
n
1
r−1+
α
4
. Figure 10 shows p1 and sets B′(n) and C′(n) for the case r = 3.
We claim for m = cn
2
r−1+α and large enough n,
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1) P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B′(n)
)
→ 1.
2) P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B′(n)
))
→ 0.
The proof follows that for the two-states case. Thus, the adversary can de-anonymize the data
and then recover X1(k) with vanishing error probability in the r-states model.
C. Markov Chain Model
So far, we have assumed users’ data samples can have r possibilities (0, 1, · · · , r − 1) and users’
pattern are i.i.d. . Here we model users’ pattern using Markov chains to capture the dependency
of the users’ pattern over time. Again, we assume there are r possibilities (the number of states
in the Markov chains). Let E be the set of edges. More specifically, (i, l) ∈ E if there exists an
edge from i to l with probability p(i, l) > 0. What distinguishes different users is their transition
probabilities pu(i, l) (the probability that user u jumps from state i to state l). The adversary
knows the transition probabilities of all users. The model for obfuscation and anonymization is
exactly the same as before.
We show that the adversary will be able to estimate the data samples of the users with low
error probability if m(n) and an are in the appropriate range. The key idea is that the adversary
can focus on a subset of the transition probabilities that are sufficient for recovering the entire
transition probability matrix. By estimating those transition probabilities from the observed data
and matching with the known transition probabilities of the users, the adversary will be able to
first de-anonymize the data, and then estimate the actual samples of users’ data. In particular,
note that for each state i, we must have
r∑
l=1
pu(i, l) = 1, for each u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n},
so, the Markov chain of user u is completely determined by a subset of size d = |E | − r of
transition probabilities. We define the vector pu and the matrix p as
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(|E | − r)

, p = [p1, p2, · · · , pn] .
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We also consider pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function, fP(pu),
which has support on a subset of the (0, 1)|E |−r hypercube. Let Rp ⊂ Rd be the range of acceptable
values for pu, so we have
RP =
{(x1, x2 · · · , xd) ∈ (0, 1)d : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xd < 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , d} .
As before, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0, such that:
δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ Rp.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < Rp.
Using the above observations, we can establish the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain with r states and |E | edges as defined
above, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the anonymized version of Z, and
• m = cn
2
|E |−r +α for any c > 0 and α > 0;
• Ru ∼ Uni f orm[0, an], where an , c′n−
(
1
|E |−r +β
)
for any c′ > 0 and β > α4 ;
then, the adversary can successfully identify the data of user 1 as n goes to infinity.
The proof has a lot of similarity to the i.i.d. case, so we provide a sketch, mainly focusing on
the differences. We argue as follows. If the total number of observations per user is m = m(n),
then define Mi(u) to be the total number of visits by user u to state i, for i = 0, 1, · · · , r − 1.
Since the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, and m(n) → ∞, all Mi(u)m(n) converge to their
stationary values. Now conditioned on Mi(u) = mi(u), the transitions from state i to state l for
user u follow a multinomial distribution with probabilities pu(i, l).
Given the above, the setting is now very similar to the i.i.d. case. Each user is uniquely
characterized by a vector pu of size |E | − r . We define sets B′′(n) and C ′′(n) as
B
′′(n) , {(x1, x2, · · · , xd) ∈ Rp : p1(i) − ∆′′n ≤ xi ≤ p1(i) + ∆′′n, i = 1, 2, · · · , d},
C
′′(n) , {(x1, x2, · · · , xd) ∈ Rp : p1(i) − 2∆′′n < xi < p1(i) + 2∆′′n, i = 1, 2, · · · , d},
where ∆′′n = 1
n
1
|E |−r +
α
4
, and d = |E | − r . Then, we can show that for the stated values of m(n) and
an, as n becomes large:
1) P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B′′(n)
)
→ 1,
2) P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B′′(n)
))
→ 0,
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which means that the adversary can estimate the data of user 1 with vanishing error probability.
The proof is very similar to the proof of the i.i.d. case; however, there are two differences that
need to be addressed:
First, the probability of observing an erroneous observation is not exactly given by Ru. In
fact, a transition is distorted if at least one of its nodes is distorted. So, if the actual transition
is from state i to state l, then the probability of an erroneous observation is equal to
R′u = Ru + Ru − RuRu = Ru(2 − Ru).
Nevertheless, here the order only matters, and the above expression is still in the order of
an = O
(
n−
(
1
|E |−r +β
) )
.
The second difference is more subtle. As opposed to the i.i.d. case, the error probabilities are
not completely independent. In particular, if Xu(k) is reported in error, then both the transition to
that state and from that state are reported in error. This means that there is a dependency between
errors of adjacent transitions. We can address this issue in the following way: The adversary
makes his decision only based on a subset of the observations. More specifically, the adversary
looks at only odd-numbered transitions: First, third, fifth, etc., and ignores the even-numbered
transitions. In this way, the number of observations is effectively reduced from m to m2 which
again does not impact the order of the result (recall that the Markov chain is aperiodic). However,
the adversary now has access to observations with independent errors.
V. PERFECT PRIVACY ANALYSIS: MARKOV CHAIN MODEL
So far, we have provided both achievability and converse results for the i.i.d. case. However,
we have only provided the converse results for the Markov chain case. Here, we investigate
achievability for Markov chain models. It turns out that for this case, the assumed obfuscation
technique is not sufficient to achieve a reasonable level of privacy. Loosely speaking, we can
state that if the adversary can make enough observations, then he can break the anonymity.
The culprit is the fact that the sequence observed by the adversary is no longer modeled by a
Markov chain; rather, it can be modeled by a hidden Markov chain. This allows the adversary to
successfully estimate the obfuscation random variable Ru as well as the pu(i, l) values for each
sequence, and hence successfully de-anonymize the sequences.
More specifically, as we will see below, there is a fundamental difference between the i.i.d.
case and the Markov chain case. In the i.i.d. case, if the noise level is beyond a relatively small
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threshold, the adversary will be unable to de-anonymize the data and unable to recover the actual
values of the data sets for users, regardless of the (large) size of m = m(n). On the other hand, in
the Markov chain case, if m = m(n) is large enough, then the adversary can easily de-anonymize
the data. To better illustrate this, let’s consider a simple example.
Example 1. Consider the scenario where there are only two states and the users’ data samples
change between the two states according to the Markov chain shown in Figure 11. What
distinguishes the users is their different values of p. Now, suppose we use the same obfuscation
method as before. That is, to create a noisy version of the sequences of data samples, for each
user u, we generate the random variable Ru that is the probability that the data sample of the
user is changed to a different data sample by obfuscation. Specifically,
Zu(k) =

Xu(k), with probability 1 − Ru.
1 − Xu(k), with probability Ru.
0
1
))
1 1−p
mm
p
ii
Fig. 11: A state transition diagram.
To analyze this problem, we can construct the underlying Markov chain as follows. Each state
in this Markov chain is identified by two values: the real state of the user, and the observed
value by the adversary. In particular, we can write
(Real value,Observed value) ∈ {( 0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
Figure 12 shows the state transition diagram of this new Markov chain.
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Fig. 12: The state transition diagram of the new Markov chain.
We know
pi00 = pi0(1 − R) = p1 + p (1 − R).
pi01 = pi0R =
p
1 + p
R.
pi10 = pi1R =
1
1 + p
R.
pi11 = pi1(1 − R) = 11 + p (1 − R).
The observed process by the adversary is not a Markov chain; nevertheless, we can define
limiting probabilities. In particular, let θ0 be the limiting probability of observing a zero. That
is, we have
M0
m
d−→ θ0, as n→∞,
where m is the total number of observations by the adversary, and M0 is the number of 0’s
observed. Then,
θ0 = pi00 + pi10 =
(1 − R)p + R
1 + p
.
Also, let θ1 be the limiting probability of observing a one, so
θ1 = pi01 + pi11 =
pR + (1 − R)
1 + p
= 1 − θ0.
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Now the adversary’s estimate of θ0 is given by:
θˆ0 =
(1 − R)p + R
1 + p
. (1)
Note that if the number of observations by the adversary can be arbitrarily large, the adversary
can obtain an arbitrarily accurate estimate of θ0. The adversary can obtain another equation
easily, as follows. Let θ01 be the limiting value of the portion of transitions from state 0 to 1 in
the chain observed by the adversary. We can write
θ01 = P {(00→ 01), (00→ 11), (10→ 01), (10→ 11)}
= pi00(1 − R) + pi10PR + pi10(1 − p)(1 − R).
As a result,
θˆ01 =
p(1 − R)2 + R (PR(1 − R)(1 − p))
1 + p
. (2)
Again, if the number of observations can be arbitrarily large, the adversary can obtain an arbi-
trarily accurate estimate of θ01. By solving the Equations 3 and 4, the adversary can successfully
recover R and p; thus, he/she can successfully determine the users’ data values.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Markov Chain Model
As opposed to the i.i.d. case, we see from Section V that if we do not limit m = m(n), the
assumed obfuscation method will not be sufficient to achieve perfect privacy. There are a few
natural questions here. First, for a given noise level, what would be the maximum m(n) that
could guarantee perfect privacy in this model? The more interesting question is, how can we
possibly modify the obfuscation technique to make it more suitable for the Markov chain model?
A natural solution seems to be re-generating the obfuscation random variables Ru periodically.
This will keep the adversary from easily estimating them by observing a long sequence of data
at a small increase in complexity. In fact, this will make the obfuscation much more robust to
modeling uncertainties and errors. It is worth noting, however, that this change would not affect
the other results in the paper. That is, even if the obfuscation random variables are re-generated
frequently, it is relatively easy to check that all the previous theorems in the paper remain valid.
However, the increase in robustness to modeling errors will definitely be a significant advantage.
Thus, the question is how often should the random variable Ru be re-generated to strike a good
balance between complexity and privacy? These are all interesting questions for future research.
35
B. Obfuscating the Samples of Users’ Data Using Continuous Noise
Here we argue that for the setting of this paper, continuous noise such as that drawn from a
Gaussian distribution is not a good option to obfuscate the sample of users’ data drawn from a
finite alphabet when we want to achieve perfect privacy. For a better understanding, let’s consider
a simple example.
Example 2. Consider the scenario where the users’ datasets are governed by an i.i.d. model and
the number of possible values for each sample of the users’ data (r) is equal to 2 (two-states
model). Note that the data sequence for user u is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter
pu.
Assume that the actual sample of the data of user u at time k (Xu(k)) is obfuscated using
noise drawn from a Gaussian distribution (Su(k)), and Zu(k) is the obfuscated version of Xu(k).
That is, we can write
Zu(k) = Xu(k) + Su(k); Su(k) ∼ N (0, Ru) ,
where Ru is chosen from some distribution. For simplicity, we can consider Ru ∼ N
(
0, a2n
)
where
an is the noise level.
We also apply anonymization to Zu(k), and, as before, Yu(k) is the reported sample of the
data of user u at time k after applying anonymization. Per Section II, anonymization is modeled
by a random permutation Π(u) on the set of n users.
Now, the question is as follows: Is it possible to achieve perfect privacy independent of the
number of adversary’s observation (m) while using this continuous noise (Su(k)) to obfuscate
the sample of users’ data?
Note that the density function of the reported sample of the data of user u after applying
obfuscation is
fZu (z) = pu fSu(k)(z − 1) + (1 − pu) fSu(k)(z)
= pu
1√
2piRu
e−
(z−1)2
2Ru + (1 − pu) 1√
2piRu
e−
z2
2Ru .
In this case, when the adversary’s number of observations is large, the adversary can estimate
the values of Pu and Ru for each user with an arbitrarily small error probability. As a result,
the adversary can de-anonymize the data and then recover Xu(k). The conclusion here is that
a continuous noise distribution gives too much information to the adversary when used for
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obfuscation of finite alphabet data. A method to remedy this issue is to regenerate the random
variables Ru frequently (similar to our previous discussion for Markov chains). Understanding
the optimal frequency of such a regeneration and detailed analysis in this case is an interesting
future research direction.
C. Relation to Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is mainly used when there is a statistical database of users’ sensitive
information, and the goal is to protect an individual’s data while publishing aggregate information
about the database [18], [56]–[60]. The goal of differential privacy is publishing aggregate queries
with low sensitivity, which means the effect of changes in a single individual on the outcome
of the aggregated information is negligible.
In [61] three different approaches for differential privacy are presented. The one that best
matches our setting is stated as
P(X1(k) = x1 |Y)
P(X1(k) = x2 |Y) ≤ e
r
P(X1(k) = x1)
P(X1(k) = x2),
where Y is the set of reported datasets. It means Y has a limited effect on the probabilities
assigned by the attacker. In differential privacy, user 1 has strongest differential privacy when
r = 0.
In Lemma 5, we proved that if user 1 has perfect privacy, this implies that asymptotically (for
large enough n)
P
(
X1(k) = x1
Y) → P (X1(k) = x1) . (3)
P
(
X1(k) = x2
Y) → P (X1(k) = x2) . (4)
As a result, by using (3) and (4), we can conclude that if we satisfy the perfect privacy
condition given in this paper, we also satisfy differential privacy with r = 0, i.e., the strongest
case of differential privacy.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered both obfuscation and anonymization techniques to achieve
privacy. The privacy level of the users depends on both m(n) (number of observations per user by
the adversary for a fixed anonymization mapping) and an (noise level). That is, larger m(n) and
smaller an indicate weaker privacy. We characterized the limits of privacy in the entire m(n)−an
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plane for the i.i.d. case; that is, we obtained the exact values of the thresholds for m(n) and an
required for privacy to be maintained. We showed that if m(n) is fewer than O
(
n
2
r−1
)
, or an
is larger than Ω
(
n−
1
r−1
)
, users have perfect privacy. On the other hand, if neither of these two
conditions is satisfied, users have no privacy. For the case where the users’ patterns are modeled
by Markov chains, we obtained a no-privacy region in the m(n) − an plane.
Future research in this area needs to characterize the exact privacy/no-privacy regions when
user data sequences obey Markov models. It is also important to consider different ways to
obfuscate users’ data sets and study the utility-privacy trade-offs for different types of obfuscation
techniques.
APPENDIX A
LEMMA 6 AND ITS PROOF
Here we state that we can condition on high-probability events.
Lemma 6. Let p ∈ (0, 1), and X ∼ Bernoulli(p) be defined on a probability space (Ω, F , P).
Consider B1, B2, · · · be a sequence of events defined on the same probability space such that
P(Bn) → 1 as n goes to infinity. Also, let Y be a random vector (matrix) in the same probability
space, then:
I(X;Y) → 0 iff I(X;Y|Bn) → 0.
Proof. First, we prove that as n becomes large,
H(X |Bn) − H(X) → 0. (5)
Note that as n goes to infinity,
P (X = 1) = P
(
X = 1
Bn) P (Bn) + P (X = 1Bn) P (Bn)
= P
(
X = 1
Bn) ,
thus,
(
X
Bn) d−→ X , and as n goes to infinity,
H (X |Bn) − H(X) → 0.
Similarly, as n becomes large,
P
(
X = 1
Y = y) → P (X = 1Y = y, Bn) ,
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and
H (X |Y = y, Bn) − H (X |Y = y) → 0. (6)
Remembering that
I (X;Y) = H(X) − H(X |Y), (7)
and using (5), (6), and (7), we can conclude that as n goes to infinity,
I (X;Y|Bn) − I (X,Y) → 0.
As a result, for large enough n,
I (X;Y) → 0⇐⇒ I (X;Y|Bn) → 0.

APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Here we provide a formal proof for Lemma 1 which we restate as follows.
Let N be a positive integer, and let a1, a2, · · · , aN and b1, b2, · · · , bN be real numbers such
that au ≤ bu for all u. Assume that X1, X2, · · · , XN are N independent random variables such
that
Xu ∼ Uni f orm[au, bu].
Let also γ1, γ2, · · · , γN be real numbers such that
γ j ∈
N⋂
u=1
[au, bu] for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
Suppose that we know the event E has occurred, meaning that the observed values of Xu’s is
equal to the set of γ j’s (but with unknown ordering), i.e.,
E ≡ {X1, X2, · · · , XN } = {γ1, γ2, · · · , γN },
then
P
(
X1 = γ j |E
)
=
1
N
.
Proof. Define sets P and Pj as follows:
P = The set of all permutations Π on {1, 2, · · · , N}.
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Pj = The set of all permutations Π on {1, 2, · · · , N} such that Π(1) = j .
We have |P| = N! and |P| = (N − 1)!. Then
P(X1 = α j |E) =
∑
pi∈Pj fX1,X2,··· ,XN (γpi(1), γpi(2), · · · , γpi(N))∑
pi∈P fX1,X2,··· ,XN (γpi(1), γpi(2), · · · , γpi(N))
=
(N − 1)!
N∏
u=1
1
bu−au
N!
N∏
u=1
1
bu−au
=
1
N
.

APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Here, we provide a formal proof for Lemma 4 which we restate as follows. The following
lemma confirms that the number of elements in J(n) goes to infinity as n becomes large.
If N (n) , |J(n) |, then N (n) → ∞ with high probability as n → ∞. More specifically, there
exists λ > 0 such that
P
(
N (n) >
λ
2
n
β
2
)
→ 1.
Proof. Define the events A, B as
A ≡ p1 ≤ Pu ≤ p1 + n
B ≡ p1 + n ≤ Qu ≤ p1 + (1 − 2p1)an.
Then, for u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and 0 ≤ p1 < 12 :
P
(
u ∈ J(n)
)
= P (A ∩ B)
= P (A) P (BA) .
So, given p1 ∈ (0, 1) and the assumption 0 < δ1 < fp < δ2, for n large enough, we have
P(A) =
∫ p1+n
p1
fP(p)dp,
so, we can conclude that
nδ1 < P(A) < nδ2.
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We can find a δ such that δ1 < δ < δ2 and
P(A) = nδ. (8)
We know
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uni f orm [pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an] ,
so, according to Figure 6, for p1 ≤ pu ≤ p1 + n,
P (B |Pu = pu) = p1 + (1 − 2p1)an − p1 − npu + (1 − 2pu)an − pu
=
(1 − 2p1)an − n
(1 − 2pu)an
≥ (1 − 2p1)an − n(1 − 2p1)an
= 1 − n(1 − 2p1)an ,
which implies
P (B |A) ≥ 1 − n(1 − 2p1)an . (9)
Using (8) and (9), we can conclude
P
(
u ∈ J(n)
)
≥ nδ
(
1 − n(1 − 2p1)an
)
.
Then, we can say that N (n) has a binomial distribution with expected value of N (n) greater than
nnδ
(
1 − n(1−2p1)an
)
, and by substituting n and an, for any c′ > 0, we get
E
[
N (n)
]
≥ δ
(
n
β
2 − 1
c′(1 − 2p1)
)
≥ λn β2 .
Now by using Chernoff bound, we have
P
(
N (n) ≤ (1 − θ)E
[
N (n)
] )
≤ e− θ
2
2 E[N (n)],
so, if we assume θ = 12 , we can conclude for large enough n,
P
(
N (n) ≤ λ
2
n
β
2
)
≤ P
(
N (n) ≤ E
[
N (n)
]
2
)
≤ e− E[N
(n)]
8
≤ e− λn
β
2
8 → 0.
As a result, N (n) →∞ with high probability for large enough n.

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APPENDIX D
COMPLETION OF THE PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Let p1 ∈ (0, 1), and let N (n) be a random variable as above, i.e., N (n) →∞ as n→∞. Consider
the sequence of independent random variables Yu ∼ Bernoulli(pu) for u = 1, 2, · · · , N (n) such
that
1) For all n and all u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N (n)}, |pu − p1 | ≤ ζn.
2) lim
n→∞ ζn = 0.
Define
Y ,
1
N (n)
N (n)∑
u=1
Yu,
then Y
d−→ p1.
Proof. Note
E[Y ] = 1
N (n)
N (n)∑
u=1
pu
≤ 1
N (n)
N (n)∑
u=1
(p1 + ζn)
=
1
N (n)
· N (n)(p1 + ζn)
= p1 + ζn.
Similarly we can prove E
[
Y
]
≥ p1 − ζn. Since as n becomes large, ζn → 0 and p1 ∈ (0, 1),
we can conclude
lim
n→∞ E
[
Y
]
= p1. (10)
Also,
Var
(
Y
)
=
1(
N (n)
)2 N (n)∑
u=1
pu (1 − pu)
≤ 1(N (n))2
N (n)∑
u=1
(p1 + ζn) (1 − p1 + ζn)
=
1
(N (n))2 · N
(n) (p1 + ζn) (1 − p1 + ζn)
=
1
N (n)
(p1 + ζn) (1 − p1 + ζn) .
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Thus,
lim
n→∞Var
(
Y
)
= 0. (11)
By using (10), (11), and Chebyshev’s inequality, we can conclude
Y
d−→ p1.

REFERENCES
[1] N. Takbiri, A. Houmansadr, D. L. Goeckel, and H. Pishro-Nik, “Limits of location privacy under anonymization and
obfuscation,” in International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). Aachen, Germany: IEEE, 2017, pp. 764–768.
[2] Federal Trade Commission Staff, “Internet of things: Privacy and security in a connected world,” 2015.
[3] P. Porambag, M. Ylianttila, C. Schmitt, P. Kumar, A. Gurtov, and A. V. Vasilakos, “The quest for privacy in the internet
of things,” IEEE Cloud Computing, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 36–45, 2016.
[4] A. Ukil, S. Bandyopadhyay, and A. Pal, “IoT-privacy: To be private or not to be private,” in IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS). Toronto, ON, Canada: IEEE, 2014, pp. 123–124.
[5] S. Hosseinzadeh, S. Rauti, S. Hyrynsalmi, and V. Leppänen, “Security in the internet of things through obfuscation and
diversification,” in IEEE Conference on Computing, Communication and Security (ICCCS). Pamplemousses, Mauritius:
IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–5.
[6] N. Apthorpe, D. Reisman, and N. Feamster, “A Smart Home is No Castle: Privacy Vulnerabilities of Encrypted IoT Traffic,”
in Workshop on Data and Algorithmic Transparency, 2016.
[7] J. Unnikrishnan, “Asymptotically optimal matching of multiple sequences to source distributions and training sequences,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 452–468, 2014.
[8] G. P. Corser, H. Fu, and A. Banihani, “Evaluating location privacy in vehicular communications and applications,” IEEE
Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 17, no. 9, pp. 2658–2667, 2016.
[9] B. Hoh and M. Gruteser, “Protecting location privacy through path confusion,” in First International Conference on Security
and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks (SecureComm). Pamplemousses, Mauritius: IEEE, 2005,
pp. 194–205.
[10] J. Freudiger, M. Raya, M. Félegyházi, P. Papadimitratos, and J. P. Hubaux, “Mix-zones for location privacy in vehicular
networks,” Vancouver, 2007.
[11] Z. Ma, F. Kargl, and M. Weber, “A location privacy metric for v2x communication systems,” in IEEE Sarnoff Symposium.
Princeton, NJ, USA: IEEE, 2009, pp. 1–6.
[12] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, G. Danezis, J.-P. Hubaux, and J. Y. Le Boudec, “Quantifying location privacy: the case
of sporadic location exposure,” in International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Waterloo, ON, Canada:
Springers, 2011, pp. 57–76.
[13] F. M. Naini, J. Unnikrishnan, P. Thiran, and M. Vetterli, “Where you are is who you are: User identification by matching
statistics,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 358–372, 2016.
[14] R. Soltani, D. Goeckel, D. Towsley, and A. Houmansadr, “Towards provably invisible network flow fingerprints,” in 2017
51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, Oct 2017, pp. 258–262.
43
[15] R. Soltani, D. Goeckel, D. Towsley, and A. Houmansadr, “Invisible network de-anonymization,” arXiv preprint arXiv,
2018.
[16] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, C. Troncoso, J. P. Hubaux, and J. Y. Le Boudec, “Protecting location privacy: optimal
strategy against localization attacks,” in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and Communications
Security. Raleigh, North Carolina, USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 617–627.
[17] M. Gruteser and D. Grunwald, “Anonymous usage of location-based services through spatial and temporal cloaking,” in
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services. San Francisco, California,
USA: ACM, 2003, pp. 31–42.
[18] N. E. Bordenabe, K. Chatzikokolakis, and C. Palamidessi, “Optimal geo-indistinguishable mechanisms for location privacy,”
in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Scottsdale, Arizona,
USA: ACM, 2014, pp. 251–262.
[19] Y. Zhang, W. Tong, and S. Zhong, “On designing satisfaction-ratio-aware truthful incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity
location privacy,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 11, pp. 2528–2541, 2016.
[20] R. Dewri and R. Thurimella, “Exploiting service similarity for privacy in location-based search queries,” IEEE Transactions
on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 374–383, 2014.
[21] B. Gedik and L. Liu, “Location privacy in mobile systems: A personalized anonymization model,” in 25th IEEE
International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems. Columbus, OH, USA: IEEE, 2005, pp. 620–629.
[22] G. Zhong and U. Hengartner, “A distributed k-anonymity protocol for location privacy,” in IEEE International Conference
on Pervasive Computing and Communications. Galveston, TX, USA: IEEE, 2009, pp. 1–10.
[23] L. Sweeney, “k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy,” International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and
Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 10, no. 05, pp. 557–570, 2002.
[24] P. Kalnis, G. Ghinita, K. Mouratidis, and D. Papadias, “Preventing location-based identity inference in anonymous spatial
queries,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 19, pp. 1719–1733, 2007.
[25] X. Liu, K. Liu, L. Guo, X. Li, and Y. Fang, “A game-theoretic approach for achieving k-anonymity in location based
services,” in IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications(INFOCOM). Turin, Italy: IEEE, 2013, pp.
2985–2993.
[26] A. R. Beresford and F. Stajano, “Location privacy in pervasive computing,” IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol. 2, pp. 46–55,
2003.
[27] J. Freudiger, R. Shokri, and J.-P. Hubaux, “On the optimal placement of mix zones,” in Proceedings of the 9th International
Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Seattle, WA, USA, 2009, pp. 216–234.
[28] B. Palanisamy and L. Liu, “Mobimix: Protecting location privacy with mix-zones over road networks,” in 27th International
Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE). Hannover, Germany: IEEE, 2011, pp. 494–505.
[29] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, P. Papadimitratos, E. Kazemi, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Hiding in the mobile crowd: Location
privacy through collaboration,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 266–279,
2014.
[30] M. A. Zurbaran, K. Avila, P. Wightman, and M. Fernandez, “Near-rand: Noise-based location obfuscation based on random
neighboring points,” IEEE Latin America Transactions, vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 3661–3667, 2015.
[31] B. Hoh, M. Gruteser, H. Xiong, and A. Alrabady, “Preserving privacy in gps traces via uncertainty-aware path cloaking,”
in Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Alexandria, Virginia, USA:
ACM, 2007, pp. 161–171.
[32] M. Wernke, P. Skvortsov, F. Dürr, and K. Rothermel, “A classification of location privacy attacks and approaches,” Personal
and Ubiquitous Computing, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 163–175, 2014.
44
[33] C.-Y. Chow, M. F. Mokbel, and X. Liu, “Spatial cloaking for anonymous location-based services in mobile peer-to-peer
environments,” An International Journal on Advances of Computer Science for Geographic Information Systems, vol. 15,
no. 2, pp. 351–380, 2011.
[34] J.-H. Um, H.-D. Kim, and J.-W. Chang, “An advanced cloaking algorithm using hilbert curves for anonymous location
based service,” in Second International Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom). Minneapolis, MN, USA: IEEE,
2010, pp. 1093–1098.
[35] H. Kido, Y. Yanagisawa, and T. Satoh, “Protection of location privacy using dummies for location-based services,” in 21st
International Conference on Data Engineering Workshops. Tokyo, Japan, Japan: IEEE, 2005, pp. 1248–1248.
[36] P. Shankar, V. Ganapathy, and L. Iftode, “Privately querying location-based services with sybilquery,” in Proceedings of
the 11th international Conference on Ubiquitous computing. Orlando, Florida, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 31–40.
[37] R. Chow and P. Golle, “Faking contextual data for fun, profit, and privacy,” in Proceedings of the 8th ACM Workshop on
Privacy in the Electronic Society. Chicago, Illinois, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 105–108.
[38] H. Kido, Y. Yanagisawa, and T. Satoh, “An anonymous communication technique using dummies for location-based
services,” in International Conference on Pervasive Services. Santorini, Greece, Greece: IEEE, 2005, pp. 88–97.
[39] H. Lu, C. S. Jensen, and M. L. Yiu, “Pad: privacy-area aware, dummy-based location privacy in mobile services,” in
Proceedings of the Seventh ACM International Workshop on Data Engineering for Wireless and Mobile Access. Vancouver,
Canada: ACM, 2008, pp. 16–23.
[40] S. L. Warner, “Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating evasive answer bias,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association, vol. 60, no. 309, pp. 63–69, 1965.
[41] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, J.-Y. Le Boudec, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Quantifying location privacy,” in IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (SP). Berkeley, CA, USA: IEEE, 2011, pp. 247–262.
[42] H. Li, H. Zhu, S. Du, X. Liang, and X. Shen, “Privacy leakage of location sharing in mobile social networks: Attacks and
defense,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. PP, no. 99, 2016.
[43] A. M. Olteanu, K. Huguenin, R. Shokri, M. Humbert, and J. P. Hubaux, “Quantifying interdependent privacy risks with
location data,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 16, no. 3, p. 829, 2016.
[44] X. Zhang, X. Gui, F. Tian, S. Yu, and J. An, “Privacy quantification model based on the bayes conditional risk in location-
based services,” Tsinghua Science and Technology, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 452–462, 2014.
[45] K. Kalantari, O. Kosut, and L. Sankar, “Information-theoretic privacy with general distortion constraints,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1708.05468, 2017. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1708.05468
[46] S. Salamatian, A. Zhang, F. du Pin Calmon, S. Bhamidipati, N. Fawaz, B. Kveton, P. Oliveira, and N. Taft, “How to
hide the elephant-or the donkey-in the room: Practical privacy against statistical inference for large data,” in IEEE Global
Conference on Signal and Information Processing. Austin, TX, USA: IEEE, 2013, pp. 269–272.
[47] I. Csiszár, “Almost independence and secrecy capacity,” Problemy Peredachi Informatsii, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 48–57, 1996.
[48] F. P. Calmon, A. Makhdoumi, and M. Médard, “Fundamental limits of perfect privacy,” in IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory (ISIT). Hong Kong, China: IEEE, 2015, pp. 1796–1800.
[49] L. Sankar, S. R. Rajagopalan, and H. V. Poor, “Utility-privacy tradeoffs in databases: An information-theoretic approach,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 838–852, 2013.
[50] J. Liao, L. Sankar, F. du Pin Calmon, and V. Y. F. Tan, “Hypothesis testing under maximal leakage privacy constraints,”
in International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). Aachen, Germany: IEEE, 2017, pp. 779–783.
[51] K. Kalantari, L. Sankar, and O. Kosut, “On information-theoretic privacy with general distortion cost functions,” in
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). Aachen, Germany: IEEE, 2017, pp. 2865–2869.
45
[52] H. Yamamoto, “A source coding problem for sources with additional outputs to keep secret from the receiver or wiretappers
(corresp.),” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 918–923, 1983.
[53] J. Liao, L. Sankar, V. Y. F. Tan, and F. du Pin Calmon, “Hypothesis testing in the high privacy limit,” in 54th Annual
Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton). Monticello, IL, USA: IEEE, 2016, pp.
649–656.
[54] Z. Montazeri, A. Houmansadr, and H. Pishro-Nik, “Achieving Perfect Location Privacy in Wireless Devices Using
Anonymization,” IEEE Transaction on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 12, no. 11, pp. 2683–2698, 2017.
[55] N. Takbiri, A. Houmansadr, D. L. Goeckel, and H. Pishro-Nik, “Fundamental limits of location privacy using anonymiza-
tion,” in Annual Conference on Information Science and Systems (CISS). Baltimore, MD, USA: IEEE, 2017.
[56] J. Lee and C. Clifton, “Differential identifiability,” in Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (SIGKDD). Beijing, China: ACM, 2012, pp. 1041–1049.
[57] K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi, and M. Stronati, “Geo-indistinguishability: A principled approach to location privacy,”
in International Conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology. Springer, 2015, pp. 49–72.
[58] H. H. Nguyen, J. Kim, and Y. Kim, “Differential privacy in practice,” Journal of Computing Science and Engineering,
vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 177–186, 2013.
[59] A. Machanavajjhala, D. Kifer, J. Abowd, J. Gehrke, and L. Vilhuber, “Privacy: Theory meets practice on the map,” in 4th
International Conference on Data Engineering. Cancun, Mexico: IEEE, 2008, pp. 277–286.
[60] K. Kalantari, L. Sankar, and A. D. Sarwate, “Robust privacy-utility tradeoffs under differential privacy and hamming
distortion,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 2816–2830, 2018.
[61] M. E. Andrés, N. E. Bordenabe, K. Chatzikokolakis, and C. Palamidessi, “Geo-indistinguishability: differential privacy
for location-based systems,” in Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Berlin, Germany, 2013, pp. 901–914.
